THE NINTH LETTER

بِاسْمِهِ سُبْحَانَهُ وَاِنْ مِنْ شَيْءٍ اِلاَّ يُسَبِّحُ بِحَمْدِهِ

[Again part of the letter he sent to that sincere student of his.]

Secondly: Your success, endeavour and eagerness in spreading the nûrs of the Qur'an are a bestowal (Ikrâm) of Allah, rather a karâmât of the Qur'an and ‘inâyah of Ar-Rabb. I congratulate you. In connection to the discussion of karâmât, bestowal (Ikrâm) and ‘inâyah having come, I shall tell you a difference between karâmât and bestowal (Ikrâm). It is as follows:

To disclose a karâmât without necessity is harmful. Whereas to disclose a bestowal is making the ni’mah of Allah known. If a person honoured with karâmât knows that he displays an extraordinary act, and if his nafs al-ammarah remained, it might be istidraj in respect of relying on himself, his nafs and kashf and falling into pride. If he displays an extraordinary act without knowing it; for example, a question presents in someone’s heart, he gives a congruous answer to that question with a speech endowed by Allah; then he understands it. After understanding it, his trust in his own Rabb increases, not in his own nafs. And he says: "I have a Hafîdh, Who does tarbiyyah me better than myself."; he increases his tawakkul. This kind is a harmless karâmât; he is not charged with concealing it, but he should not intentionally try to display it for pride. Because he might relate it to his nafs since, apparently, man's kasb has a share in it. As for the bestowal, it is safer than the second kind of safe karâmât, and in my opinion, is more elevated. To make it known is to make the ni’mah of Allah known. The kasb has no share in it; his nafs does not attribute it to itself.

Thus, my brother, the bounties of Allah concerning both you and me, particularly concerning our service of the Qur'an, which I have seen and written about from of old, are a bestowal (Ikrâm); to make them known is to make the ni’mah of Allah known. Therefore, I write to you about the success of the service of both of us from among the kind of making the ni’mah of Allah known. I always knew that it arouses the vein of shukr in you, not pride.

Thirdly: I see that the most fortunate person in the life of this world is one who accepts the world as a military guesthouse and has idh‘ân in that way and acts accordingly. And through that acceptance, he can swiftly gain the rank of acceptance and pleasure of Allah, the greatest rank; he would not give the price of a perpetual diamond to a thing with the price of a piece of glass that will break; he passes his life within istiqâmah and with pleasure. Yes, the matters belonging to the world are glasses doomed to be broken, while the eternal matters belonging to the âkhirah possess the value of extremely solid diamonds. The intense feelings in man's fitrah, such as intense curiosity, fervent love, terrible ambition, obstinately desiring, and so on, have been given to him to gain the matters belonging to the âkhirah. To turn those feelings intensely towards transitory matters of the world is giving the price of eternal diamonds to transient glasses that will break. A point occurred to the mind in connection with this; I shall tell it. It is as follows:

‘Ashq is an intense love. When it turns towards transitory beloveds, it either causes its owner to suffer perpetual torment and pain or, since the metaphorical beloved is not worth the price of such intense love, it causes its owner to search for an eternal beloved; the metaphorical ‘ashq transforms into true (Haqîqî) ‘ashq.

Thus, there are thousands of feelings in man. Like ‘ashq, each of them has two degrees. One is metaphorical, the other is true (Haqîqî).

For example, the feeling of anxiety about the future is present in everyone. When one suffers intense anxiety, he looks and sees that he does not have a certain proof in his hand to reach the future he is anxious about. Furthermore, a future that is brief and guaranteed with respect to rizq is not worth such intense anxiety. So, he turns his face away from it and turns towards a true and long future beyond the grave that has not been guaranteed for the ghâfils.

He also displays intense ambition for possessions and rank, and then he looks and sees that the transient possession that has been put temporarily under his supervision and the calamitous fame and perilous rank that are the sources of riyâ are not worth such intense ambition. From it, he turns towards ma’nawî ranks and degrees of closeness to Allah that are true ranks and towards the stock of provisions for the âkhirah and ‘amal as-sâlih that are true possessions. The metaphorical ambition that is a bad trait transforms into true ambition, which is an elevated trait.

Furthermore, for example, with intense obstinacy, he spends his feelings on insignificant, fading, transient matters; he sees that he has been obstinate for a year over something not worth even a minute of obstinacy. He also persists in a poisonous and harmful thing out of obstinacy. Then he sees that this powerful feeling was not given to him for such things. Spending it on them is contrary to hikmah and haqiqah. Then he spends that intense obstinacy not on those useless transitory matters, but on the elevated and eternal haqiqahs of îmân, principles of Islam and services for the âkhirah; such metaphorical obstinacy that is a contemptible trait transforms into true obstinacy that is ardent steadfastness on haqq, a beautiful and elevated trait.

Thus, like these three examples, if man uses the ma’nawî faculties given to him on account of the nafs and the world and acts with ghaflah as though he will eternally remain in the world, they become sources of contemptible morality, wastefulness and futility. But if he spends ma’nawî faculties that are not severe on the matters of the world and the intense ones on ma’nawî duties and the duties belonging to the âkhirah, they become the sources of praiseworthy morality and the means to happiness in both worlds in a way conforming to hikmah and haqiqah.

Thus, I guess that one reason for the advice of those who give advice remaining ineffective at this time is they say to the people who possess bad moral: "Don't be envious! Don't display ambition! Don't hate! Don't be obstinate! Don't love the world!" That is, like changing their fitrah, they propose something which they deem impossible. If they say: "Turn the face of these feelings toward things which are khayr; change their channel!" both the advice would be effective and it would be an order proposed within the sphere of their will.

Fourthly: Amongst the ‘Ulamâ of Islam, the differences between Islam and îmân have been discussed much. One group has said: “They are the same”, while another has said: “They are not the same, but one cannot be without the other.” They have declared various ideas like these. I understood the following difference:

Islam is iltizâm; îmân is idh'ân, in other words, Islam is supporting the haqq and submission and obedience; while îmân is accepting the haqq and affirming it. In the past, I saw certain irreligious people that they were fervently displaying support for the laws of the Qur'an. It means that in one respect, due to having the iltizâm of haqq, that irreligious man possessed Islam in one aspect; he was called “An irreligious Muslim.” Then later, I saw certain mu’mins who did not display support for the laws of the Qur'an and did not have iltizâm. They were worthy of the term "A non-Muslim mu’min."

Can îmân without Islam be the means of salvation?

The Answer: Just as Islam without îmân is not the cause of salvation, so îmân without Islam cannot be the means of salvation. Falillahilhamdu wal-minnatu1 , through the faydh of the Qur'an's ma’nawî miraculousness, the comparisons in the Risale-i Nur have demonstrated the fruits and results of the religion of Islam and the haqiqahs of the Qur'an in such a way that even if an irreligious man understands them, not supporting them will not be possible for him. Also, they demonstrated the evidence and proofs of îmân and Islam such powerfully that if even a non-Muslim understands them, he will certainly affirm them. Even if he remains non-Muslim, he will believe.

Yes, The Words have demonstrated the fruits of îmân and Islam, which are sweet and beautiful like the fruits of the Tûbâ tree of Jannah, and demonstrated such pleasant and agreeable results of them as the beauties of happiness in both worlds that they give to those who see and know them an infinite feeling of support, iltizâm and submission. And they have demonstrated proofs of îmân and Islam as powerful as the chains of beings and as numerous as particles that they give an endless idh‘ân and strength of îmân. To a degree that while reciting the testify to îmân (Shahâdah) in the awrâd of Shah Naqshband, when I say عَلَى ذلِكَ نَحْيَى وَ عَلَيْهِ نَمُوتُ وَ عَلَيْهِ نُبْعَثُ غَدًا2 I feel an endless feeling of support. If the whole world was given to me, I could not sacrifice a single haqiqah of îmân. It is excruciating for me to imagine the opposite of a haqiqah of îmân for a minute. If the whole world was mine, my nafs would submit without hesitation to give it for the existence of a single haqiqah of îmân. When I sayوَ آمَنَّا بِمَا اَرْسَلْتَ مِنْ رَسُولٍ وَ آمَنَّا بِمَا اَنْزَلْتَ مِنْ كِتَابٍ وَ صَدَّقْنَا3 , I feel the infinite strength of îmân. I consider that the opposite of each of the haqiqahs of îmân is rationally impossible and the people of dhalâlah are extremely foolish and crazy.

I send many salâms to your parents and offer them my respects. I request that they offer du‘â for me as well. Since you are my brother, they are my mother and father as well. Also, I send salâm to the people of your village, especially to all those who listened to “The Words” from you.

اَلْبَاقِى هُوَ الْبَاقِى

Said Nursî

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